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INTRODUCTION 
 
This Article contends that the Federal Communications Commission’s 
(FCC) structural organization in “silos” that match up with technologies it 
regulates—media, wireline and wireless—should be replaced with an organi-
zation based on functions—policy, economics, licensing, grantmaking, and 
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engineering. To accomplish this, the FCC would create three new bureaus—
Policy and Economics, Licensing and Grantmaking, and Engineering—and 
modestly restructure its Enforcement Bureau. 
The silo-based organization of the FCC dated from the 1930’s, and it 
was appropriate in its time. However, with the growing convergence of 
technologies, the retention of silo-based organization will lead to inefficien-
cies, suboptimal regulatory outcomes, and irrationally non-neutral treatment of 
technological platforms. 
A sleeper in this debate is the impact of a potential function-based 
reorganization of the FCC on its civil rights regulatory responsibilities:  equal 
employment opportunity (EEO), equal transactional opportunity, equal procur-
ement opportunity, and advertising nondiscrimination. This Article describes 
why a function-based FCC would dramatically improve the FCC’s ability to 
administer its civil rights management and enforcement duties.  With all civil 
rights functionality centralized and operated with best practices across all 
technologies, a functionally-structured FCC would be in a position to deliver 
equal opportunity to all corners of the industries that constitute one-sixth of the 
economy, that define our democracy and our culture, and that make us who we 
are as a people. 
 
I.  HOW THE FCC ADVANCES CIVIL RIGHTS 
 
For five decades, the FCC has led the federal government in advancing 
diversity in the industries it regulates. In 1968, the FCC became the first federal 
agency to require its licensees to practice nondiscrimination in employment.1 
Ten years later, in 1978, the Commission became the first federal agency to 
adopt policies fostering minority ownership of licensed facilities.2 
 These actions were taken by design rather than by accident. The FCC 
does not regulate widgets—it regulates the most influential industries in the 
world. Our democracy hinges on the thoughtful FCC oversight of these 
industries. The framers of the Communications Act of 1934 appreciated this, 
having created the FCC to regulate “interstate and foreign commerce in comm-
unication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all 
the people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide 
wire and radio communication service.”3 Congress in 1996 improved upon that 
formulation by adding the words “without discrimination on the basis of race, 
																																								 																				
1 Nondiscrimination in the Employment Practices of Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.2d 766 (1968). 
2 Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979 (1978). 
3 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934). 
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color, religion, national origin, or sex.”4 Congress has acted favorably, or has 
not stood in the way, as the FCC developed a broad range of regulations 
governing equal employment opportunity,5 equal transactional opportunity,6 
advertising nondiscrimination,7 and equal procurement opportunity8—as well 
as policies designed to foster ownership of media and telecom facilities by 
minorities and women.9 
 Beginning in 1995, the scope of the FCC’s actions has been limited by 
court decisions holding that such rules and policies must be race-neutral even 
where there is overwhelming evidence of systemic discrimination.10 While the 
																																								 																				
4 47 U.S.C. § 151 (providing language added in the Telecommunications Act of 1996). 
5 See 47 U.S.C. § 334 (discussing the Commission’s equal employment opportunity regulations 
that apply to television broadcast station licensees and permittees); see also 47 U.S.C. § 554 
(stating that Equal opportunity in employment shall be afforded by any corporation, partnership, 
association, joint-stock company, or trust engaged primarily in the management or operation of 
any cable system; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.881, 47 C.F.R. § 90.168, and 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080 
(providing broadcasting equal employment opportunity regulations); (47 C.F.R. § 22.321, 47 
C.F.R. § 101.311, 47 C.F.R § 101.3, and 47 C.F.R § 101.4 (stating the regulations for common 
carriers); and 47 C.F.R. §§ 21.920, 47 C.F.R § 25.601, 47 C.F.R § 74.996, 47 C.F.R § 76.71, 47 
C.F.R § 76.73, 47 C.F.R § 76.75, 47 C.F.R § 76.77, 47 C.F.R § 76.79, 47 C.F.R § 76.1702, 47 
C.F.R § 76.1702, 47 C.F.R § 76.1802, and 47 C.F.R § 100.51 (applying equal opportunity 
regulations to multichannel video program distributors (“MVPDs”)). 
6 47 C.F.R. § 73.2090 (adopted in U.S. FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N., MB DOCKET NO. 07-
294, FCC 16-1, PROMOTING DIVERSIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE BROADCASTING 
SERVICES (Nov. 24, 2017) at 55772-3; see also U.S. FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N., 23 FCC 
Rcd. 5922, 5939-40, IN THE MATTER OF PROMOTING DIVERSIFICATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE 
BROADCAST SERVICES, REPORT AND ORDER AND THIRD NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING 
(2008) [hereinafter 2008 Diversity Order]. 
7 Adopted in the 2008 Diversity Order, supra note 6, at 5941-42 (not codified in the C.F.R.). 
8 47 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(E) (stating that the FCC must develop rules to ensure that an MVPD 
shall “encourage minority and female entrepreneurs to conduct business with all parts of its 
operation”). The rules are found at 47 C.F.R. § 76.75(e). 
9 Some of these policies were short-lived, and their impact was often diluted by policies that 
pulled in the opposite direction.  See David Honig, McGannon Lecture on Communications 
Practices and Ethics, Fordham University: How the FCC Helped Exclude Minorities from 
Ownership of the Airwaves (Oct. 2006), http://mmtconline.org/lp-pdf/DH-McGannon-Lec 
ture-100506.pdf (discussing broadcast ownership diversity).  
10 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (holding that “any person, 
of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution 
justify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest 
judicial scrutiny”); see also Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344, 352-53 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that the Commission’s broadcast EEO rule was an unconstitutional 
race-based classification and the rule was subject to strict constitutional scrutiny because it was 
“built on the notion that stations should aspire to a workforce that attains, or at least approaches, 
proportional [racial] representation” and “oblige[d] stations to grant some degree of preference to 
minorities in hiring.”); MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass’n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(“MD/DE/DE Broadcasters”) (providing the rule “under which nonminorities are less likely to 
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FCC brought fourteen employment discrimination cases to trial before admin-
istrative law judges in the 1970s,11 the agency has not brought such a case to trial 
in the past twenty years, even though racial discrimination in broadcasting has 
failed to abate and, in some respects, appears to have gotten worse.12 
 At the FCC, the toolbox available to civil rights organizations to fight 
discrimination contains only two sets of tools: 
 
• The first set of tools is race-conscious affirmative action, 
which the FCC could pursue if it completed the “Adarand 
studies” necessary to satisfy strict scrutiny13 and met the 
requirement that it attempt essentially all race-neutral app-
roaches before turning to race-conscious ones.14 
• The second set of tools is entirely race-neutral:  the elimina-
tion of archaic regulations that operate as market entry 
barriers for new entrants such as minority broadcasters.  
The Multicultural Media, Telecom and Internet Council 
(MMTC)15 has become proficient at identifying these entry 
barriers and persuading the FCC to deregulate them—often 
in partnership with industry leaders who are equally happy 
to see the archaic rules go away. A prime example was the 
FCC’s unanimous 2013 decision to relax restrictions on 
foreign investment in broadcast licensees16—reversing a 
xenophobic 1912 policy that had foreclosed most access to 
overseas capital by American broadcasters, including Asian 
																																								 																				
receive notification of job openings solely because of their race” is “subject to strict scrutiny”).  
11 See, e.g., Leflore Broadcasting Co., Hearing Designation Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 101 (1972). 
This extraordinary enforcement record owes much to the leadership of FCC General Counsel 
and later Commissioner and Chairman Richard Wiley, and Commissioner and later NAACP 
Executive Director Benjamin Hooks. 
12 See, e.g., U.S. FED. COMMC’NS. COMM’N., MM DOCKET NO. 98-204, COMMENTS OF THE 
MINORITY MEDIA AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL IN RESPONSE TO THE THIRD 
REPORT AND ORDER AND FOURTH NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING (May 22, 2008) 
(providing an analysis of Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) data 
showing that by 2006, minorities had virtually been purged from English language, non-
minority owned radio journalism). 
13 See Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 224 (holding that “all racial classifications 
reviewable under the Equal Protection Clause must be strictly scrutinized.”). 
14 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733-35 (2007). 
15 The MMTC was known as the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council from 
1986 through 2014. 
16 See Commission Policies and Procedures under Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act, 
Foreign Investment in Broadcast Licensees, Declaratory Ruling, 28 FCC Rcd. 16244 (2013). 
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American, Latino and Caribbean American companies. 
Another example can be found in the FCC’s 2015 decision 
to authorize certain classes of small, technologically inferior 
AM stations disproportionately populated by minority owned 
broadcasters to have top priority in the queues to obtain the 
FM translators that have become essential to the survival of 
these AM stations.17 
 
But there are limits to the usefulness of these two sets of tools.   
First, the FCC has failed to perform the Adarand studies despite two 
court orders manifesting an expectation that the Commission will conduct the 
studies,18 and certainly the FCC has not come close to attempting all of the 
many race-neutral approaches19 that have been sitting before it for consider-
ation for years.20  Second, there is only so much that any agency can deregulate, 
and deregulation is not always beneficial. 
Fortunately, a third and powerful set of civil rights tools may be 
available: reorganization of the FCC itself. 
 
II.  THE FCC’S ORGANIZATION BY TECHNOLOGY “SILOS” 
 
 Today the FCC contains three major bureaus operating as technology 
“silos”:  the Media Bureau, covering radio, television, cable, and direct broad-
cast satellites;21 the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, which handles 
																																								 																				
17 Revitalization of the AM Radio Service, First Report and Order, Further Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making, and Notice of Inquiry, 30 FCC Rcd.12145, 12152 (2015) (“We 
further direct the Bureau . . . to make the first window available only to applications to modify 
and/or relocate FM translator stations rebroadcasting Class C and D AM stations. [W]e 
believe that Class C and D AM stations, because of their lack of limited power or lack of 
protected nighttime service, will benefit most from the acquisition of a cross service 
translator, and thus should be afforded the first opportunity to obtain one.”). 
18 See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 652 F.3d 431, 467-68, 471 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“Prometheus II”) (providing that “if the Commission requires more and better data to 
complete the necessary Adarand studies, it must get the data and conduct up-to-date studies, 
as it began to do in 2000 before largely abandoning the endeavor”); see also Prometheus 
Radio Project v. FCC, 824 F.3d 33, 49 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Prometheus III”) (stating that the 
Commission “must make a final determination as to whether to adopt a new [eligible entity] 
definition. If it needs more data to do so, it must get it.”).  
19 As is required by Parents Involved, supra note 14, at 733-35. 
20 See Prometheus III, supra note 18, at 50 n. 11 (remanding with the understanding that the 
FCC will consider 17 race-neutral MMTC proposals); see also infra note 71. 
21 See 47 C.F.R. § 0.61 (providing that “the Media Bureau develops, recommends and administers 
the policy and licensing programs for the regulation of media, including cable television, 
broadcast television and radio, and satellite services in the United States and its territories”). 
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cellular, paging, personal communications services, public safety, and other 
commercial and private radio services, as well as competitive bidding for 
spectrum auctions;22 and the either optimistically or oxymoronically named 
Wireline Competition Bureau, which regulates local and long distance common 
carriers: voice, data, and other telecommunication transmission services.23 The 
FCC also houses several function-based bureaus and offices whose juris-
dictions cross technological boundaries, including the Office of General 
Counsel, the Enforcement Bureau and the International Bureau. 
The “silo” model of communications industry regulation “views each 
industry sector as a distinct set of entities that do not interact and which should 
be regulated under different principles.”24 
 The FCC’s “silo” structure wasn’t planned; it is the product of history. 
The silo model emulates the Communications Act, which predates most modern 
telecommunications technology.25 Thus, the current statute classifies these 
industries under separate and often anachronistic designations of “media,” 
“information services” and “telecommunications services.” Yet nowhere in the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996—much less in the Communications Act of 
1934—are there mentions of apps, Operating Systems (OS) providers, handsets, 
or over-the-top (OTT) content.26 
What this means is that rules and policies affecting one industry tend 
to get developed in the bureau charged with regulating that industry—thus 
virtually ensuring that there will be considerable differences between other-
wise-comparable sets of rules and policies governing other industries on the 
same subject matter. 
																																								 																				
22 See 47 C.F.R. § 0.131 (stating that the Bureau is responsible for all spectrum auctions).  
23 See 47 C.F.R. § 0.91 (discussing the Wireline Competition Bureau). 
24 H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & David A. Irwin, The First Great Telecom Debate of the 21st 
Century, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 373, 379 n. 26 (2007), http://scholarship.law.edu/ 
commlaw/vol15/iss2/4/.  
25 Randolph J. May, “Why Stovepipe Regulation No Longer Works:  An Essay on the need 
for a New Market-Oriented Communications Policy,” 58 FED. COMM. L. J. 103, 104 (2006), 
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1423&context=fclj 
(providing “the stovepipes, or vertical ‘silos’ or ‘smokestacks’ as some prefer, refer to the 
distinct set of regulations that attach to a service offering once it is classified under one 
definition or the other”). 
26 Operating System, COMPUTER HOPE (Apr. 2017), https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/ 
o/os.htm.  (An OS is software that provides common services for computers and manages 
computer hardware and software resources. To function properly, a computer program must 
have an OS. OTT is a term used for the transmitting of audio, video, and other media via the 
internet without requiring its users to subscribe to a traditional pay service, such as Comcast); 
Barry Levine, MarTech Landscape: What is OTT Programming and Why Does It Matter?, 
MARTECH (July 2016), https://martechtoday.com/marketing-landscape-ott-programming-
matter-184073. 
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Throughout the FCC’s first two generations, several distinguished 
reports recommended extensive reforms in FCC top-line governance and 
decision-making, while taking for granted or not addressing the silo model for 
operations and management.27 More recently, though, as technologies have 
converged (such as separate media becoming a single IP network), the silo 
model has become the subject of extensive criticism.28 In 2012, Commissioner 
(now Chairman) Ajit Pai declared that: 
 
Today, the FCC operates under a Communications Act that was 
last substantially revised in 1996—an Act that divides the 
communications marketplace into silos of technologies and 
services. Convergence and competition have rendered this 
approach hopelessly outdated, as voice, video, and data are 
quickly becoming just packets of information carried on the 
																																								 																				
27 See Harry M. Shooshan, A Modest Proposal for Restructuring the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 637, 640 (May 1998), www.repository.law.indi 
ana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=fclj (recommending replacement of the 
multimember commission with a single administrator); see also HENRY GELLER, THE 
FEDERAL STRUCTURE FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 21 (Benton Foundation ed. 1989) 
(recommending, inter alia, a “Single Executive Branch administrator for telecom policy, 
housing but not controlling an independent agency to deal with electronic mass media 
matters”); PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 14 (1971) [hereinafter  Ash Council Report] (recommending a 
strong chair but recommending no changes in the agency’s bipartisan, multimember structure 
and not addressing bureau organization); SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86th Cong., REP. ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE 
PRESIDENT-ELECT 65 (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by James M. Landis) [hereinafter 
Landis Report] (recommending a strong chair accountable directly to the President, but not 
addressing bureau organization); COMM. ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF 
GOVERNMENT, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, A Report to Congress, 5-6 
(1949) [hereinafter Hoover Commission Report], https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001 
141813 (recommending a strong executive chairman but not calling into question the 
underlying multimember commission model or addressing bureau organization). 
28 See, e.g., Richard Adler, Rapporteur, Rethinking Communications Regulation, REP. OF THE 
27TH ANN. ASPEN INST. CONF. ON COMM. POL’Y v (2013) [hereinafter Aspen 2013], http:// 
csreports.aspeninstitute.org/documents/Rethinking-Communications-Regulation.pdf (provi-
ding that “in a world of converged media and communications, the current American 
regulatory framework still has silos of regulation that divide communications policy into 
distinct categories, essentially creating separate regulatory treatment for telephony, broad-
casting, cable television, mobile and private communications, not to mention handset 
vendors, providers of operating systems, apps developers and so-called over-the-top players 
. . . .  As the Internet and other information and communications technologies grow 
exponentially, and as a new ecosystem is emerging that could conflate previously distinct 
methods of communication into a single digital medium, questions arise as to whether these 
silos of regulation are still appropriate.”). 
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same networks. Cable operators offer phone and Internet serv-
ices. Telecommunications carriers promote video service.  
Voice over Internet Protocol (or VoIP) providers sell voice 
service and video teleconferencing. Companies like Netflix use 
the Internet to deliver video service. And wireless providers, 
once known for selling phones the size of a brick, let ever more 
mobile consumers watch videos, listen to music, play games, 
and occasionally make a call, all on the go.29 
 
A year later, Commissioner Pai “acknowledged that the FCC is 
‘hopelessly constrained’ by the existing regulatory silos based on distinctions 
between media, and that it ‘gets into absurd contortions’ when it attempts to 
develop sensible regulations given these constraints.”30  University of Florida 
economist Mark Jamison has concluded that: 
 
There seems to be a growing consensus that the FCC’s 
structure31 is outdated and hinders its work. What should be 
done? Implement a structure that moves away from antiquated 
silos—wireline, wireless, and media—to one that reflects the 
dynamic digital ecosystem and that empowers sound analytical 
work.”32 Former FCC Chairman Reed Hundt has gone farther, 
recommending that “[t]he agency should be reorganized 
forthwith according to functions with industry silos disbanded. 
No employee should be permitted to remain within a particular 
functional unit for more than five years.33 
 
Some critics of the silo model have been particularly skeptical of the 
model’s inherent diminishment of the impact of economics in FCC decision-
making. Citing the benefits of benefit-cost analysis in evaluation of rules and its 
																																								 																				
29 Ajit Pai, Commissioner, Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, Opening Remarks Before the Internet 
Transformation Panel of the Communications Liberty and Innovation Project, (Oct. 2012), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-316824A1.pdf.  
30 Aspen 2013, supra note 12.  
31 Organizational Charts of the FCC, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/about-
fcc/organizational-charts-fcc (last accessed Mar. 18, 2018).  
32 Mark Jamison, Can We Modernize the FCC? TECH POL’Y DAILY (Feb. 2017), http:// 
www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/can-modernize-fcc/.  
33 Reed E. Hundt & Gregory L. Rosston, Communications Policy for 2006 and Beyond, 58 
FED. COMM. L. J. 1, 33 (2006), www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 
1421&context=fclj. 
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endorsement by the Bush I, Clinton, Bush II and Obama administrations,34 FCC 
Chief Economist Thomas Hazlett describes how economic analysis has helped 
improve the quality of administrative rules.35 Despite this, he observes that: 
 
[E]conomic analysis, per se, generally enjoys only the support of 
relatively weak constituencies within the regulatory agency. 
Agencies have agendas that, loosely stated, are crafted to maxi-
mize support for their political benefactors (coalition partners) 
subject to the constraint the basic constitutional rules are obeyed.  
The social impacts of keenest interest are reliably communicated 
by coalition partners. Independent economic analysis of social 
welfare is neither necessary nor definitive . . .   
 
The institutional problem is to create new structures, presumably 
with in regulatory agencies, that reduce the free rider problem 
associated with economic analysis. This can, potentially, be 
achieved by endowing offices or divisions within agencies with 
the authority to conduct economic analysis of regulatory choices. 
Where such offices are controlled by economists, and endowed 
with immeasurable autonomy and influence, they can help 
advance the professional priorities of an important set of experts 
within the regulatory agency.36 
 
Hazlett notes that at the FCC there is: 
 
[N]o location anywhere in the organizational structure devoted 
primarily to economic analysis.  This includes 10 offices and 
seven bureaus. While the Office of Strategic Plans and Policy 
Analysis (OSP) includes economists, it is primarily staffed by 
non-economists, has been traditionally headed by a non-
economist, and has been reshuffled and renamed by recent FCC 
Chairman. There is a Chief Economist (CE) at the FCC, aca-
demic visitor who serves a short-term (one-year or two-year) 
appointment made by the Commission Chair. This position does 
allow the FCC to receive professional economic advice, but of a 
																																								 																				
34 Thomas W. Hazlett, Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission: A Simple 
Proposal to atone for Past Sins, Discussion Paper, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE 1-2 (April 7, 
2011), (available from David Honig) [hereinafter Hazlett] (citing Robert W. Hahn, Government 
Analysis of the Benefits and Costs of Regulation, 12 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 201, 202-3 (1998)).  
35 Hazlett, supra note 34, at 4. 
36 Id. at 6. 
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very limited sort.  Personnel can be assigned to assist the CE on 
an ad hoc basis, but there is no professional staff dedicated to 
serve under the direction of the CE. This and the short duration 
of appointments, mitigate against long-term influence in rule 
makings that typically take many years to evolve.37 
 
To cure these ailments, Hazlett proposes the creation of an Office of 
Economic Analysis, which would be an “institutional home for economists, 
well-trained in analytical concepts and highly competent in evaluating welfare 
changes associated with FCC regulation, to appraise policy issues at the agency 
and thereby influence agency outcomes. This program will succeed in raising 
the quality of regulatory decision-making to the degree that such economists 
are independent and insulated from the conclusions reached by other policy 
analyst of the agency, and are actively engaged in the process of writing 
Notices, Rulemakings, Reports and Orders.”38  Hazlett concludes that: 
 
The basic requirements for creating an Office of Economic Ana-
lysis of the FCC is that a critical mass of economic expertise be 
assembled in one location; that the office be directed by the 
economist of high rank and authority within the agency; that the 
office be given latitude to select research teams relevant study 
projects, and to thereby acquire deep knowledge of relevant 
markets and policies; that the staff professionals be active in 
scholarly research; and that this sophisticated analytical base 
productively participates in FCC policymaking. This latter, most 
important, condition requires ready access to the FCC chair, to 
other commissioners, and the bureau chiefs outside of [the Office 
of Economic Analysis].39 
 
In its proposal for the creation of a Bureau of Policy and Economics,40 this 
article draws heavily on Hazlett’s approach. 
When considering the break-up of silos, it is important to recognize that 
silos are not entirely foreign to one another. Nor could they be; nearly all of the 
FCC’s 1,688 employees41 work in the same eight-story building, and they share 
																																								 																				
37 Id. at 7-8. 
38 Id. at 16 (noting that his proposal “leans heavily on the 2004-05 proposal of Martin Perry”). 
39 Id. at 19-20. 
40 See id. at 11-13 (discussing the proposal).  
41Employee Profile at the FCC, FED. COMMC’N COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/general/ 
employee-profile-fcc#block-menu-block-4 (last accessed Mar. 18, 2018).  
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a nearby cafeteria. The Commission’s organization by silos does not mean that 
all decisions reflecting one bureau’s technology-specific body of law are 
always at odds with decisions reflecting other bureaus’ technology-specific 
bodies of law. It is not uncommon for the agency to create cross-bureau task 
forces of senior staff.42 Staff of the Media, Wireless and Wireline bureaus often 
coordinate with one another to avoid inconsistent results, and the comm-
issioners are sensitive to avoiding inconsistent or “platform skewed” outcomes. 
Nonetheless, all of this inter-bureau coordination takes effort, and at best it is 
a partial and incomplete workaround of silo design. Thus it often fails to 
produce platform-neutral outcomes. 
The Commission has not been inattentive to the need to reorganize by 
function and to graduate from the silo paradigm.  In recent years, even while 
operating within the constraints of its current structure, the Commission has 
extended regulatory parity to multiple contexts, including prohibiting exclus-
ivity contracts in video and telecommunications services in residential multiple 
tenant environments43 and, pursuant to Sections 338(a) and 338(j) of the 
Communications Act,44 establishing comparability in the cable and satellite 
carriage of digital-only stations.45  Most recently, the Commission eliminated 
the correspondence file and principal headend public file requirements in order 
to lessen the regulatory requirements imposed on commercial broadcasters and 
cable operators, thus advancing regulatory parity with respect to public file 
requirements among program distributors.46 The Commission noted that 
																																								 																				
42 Two examples: in 2002, the FCC formed the Spectrum Policy Task Force, which was 
composed of senior staff from several Commission bureaus and offices. FCC Chairman Michael 
K. Powell Announces Formation of Spectrum Policy Task Force, FCC News Release (June 6, 
2002), https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-223142A1.pdf. In 2012, the FCC 
formed the Incentive Auction Task Force with staff of most Commission bureaus and offices “to 
deploy market forces and a market-based mechanism to repurpose spectrum for flexible use, 
including mobile broadband” in order to manage the most complex auction in history.  Statement 
of FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski on the Incentive Auction Task Force (Mar. 21, 2012), 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-313140A1.pdf. 
43 See Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets (Report 
and Order), 23 FCC Rcd 5385, 5387 ¶5 (2008) (“[I]n an environment of increasingly 
competitive bundled service offerings, the importance of regulatory parity is particularly 
compelling in our determination to remove this impediment to fair competition.”). 
44 47 U.S.C. §§ 338(a) and 338(j). 
45 See Carriage of Digital Television Broadcast Signals: Amendment to Part 76 of the Comm-
ission’s Rules; Implementation of the Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999: Local 
Broadcast Signal Carriage Issues and Retransmission Consent Issues, 47 C.F.R. ¶76 (2008) 
(“The Commission has required carriage of digital-only stations by cable operators, and a 
similar requirement is both appropriate and comparable for satellite carriers.”). 
46 Revisions to Public Inspection File Requirements – Broadcast Correspondence File and 
Cable Principal Headend Location, 47 C.F.R. ¶73, 76 (2017). 
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eliminating the correspondence file affords commercial broadcasters the same 
opportunity as other entities with online file requirements to provide online 
access to all public files, thus advancing regulatory parity.47 
 
III.  A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT:  FCC REORGANIZATION BY FUNCTION 
 
Let us suppose the FCC were reorganized entirely by function—mean-
ing that the Media, Wireless and Wireline bureaus would be closed; three new 
bureaus—Policy and Economics, Licensing and Grantmaking, and Engineering, 
would be created; and an existing bureau, Enforcement, would be given additional 
functions. The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, the Office of Gen-
eral Counsel, the International Bureau, and other offices would be unchanged. 
In assigning the Media, Wireless, and Wireline bureaus’ functions to 
other bureaus, the agency would essentially be transitioning from a model in 
which the three technology silo-based bureaus were producing their “products” 
(rules, licenses, and sanctions) in three separate product lines (media, wireless, 
and wireline) to a new model in which bureaus of Policy and Economics, Licen-
sing and Grantmaking, Engineering, and Enforcement would each be producing 
separate but essential elements of these products, but across all product lines. 
A new bureau of Licensing and Grantmaking would have at its only 
purposes the issuance of licenses by granting routine applications or through 
the administration of auctions; and administering the Universal Service Fund 
(USF). These functions are classic “giving away stuff.” On its face, this 
function does not belong in the same place as policy, economics or, especially, 
enforcement.48 Further, to ensure platform neutrality, “giving away stuff” 
across technologies certainly belongs in the same place. 
Perhaps the most consequential outcome of reorganization of the 
Commission by function would be the consolidation and elevation of economic 
analysis into a Bureau of Policy and Economics. Heightening the role of 
economic analysis in FCC decision-making has been a major theme of the Pai 
administration.49 In April 2017, Chairman Pai specifically addressed the 
inefficiencies attendant to the deployment of economics in silo-based bureaus:50 
																																								 																				
47 Id.  
48 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.91 infra note 65 for more information on categories of functions. 
49 Mark Jamison, Will Chairman Pai resurrect economics at the FCC?, AEI (Apr. 6, 2017),  
http://www.techpolicydaily.com/communications/will-chairman-pai-resurrect-economics-fcc/.  
Dr. Jamison’s article reports on an address Chairman Pai delivered at the Hudson Institute, 
Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Remarks at the Hudson Institute: The Importance 
of Economic Analysis at the FCC (Apr. 5, 2017) in which the Chairman announced that he 
intends to create an Office of Economics and Data as a first step toward elevating the role of 
economics in FCC regulation. 
50 Id. 
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[E]conomists work in siloes. This impedes their productivity and 
impairs agency efficiency. For example, at any given time, 
economists in one Bureau can be quite busy.  But economists in 
another Bureau might not have much work.  In a converged 
marketplace, economists with expertise in one context may be 
able to contribute significantly to addressing problems in 
another. There can be great benefit from this cross-fertilization 
of ideas. And our economists are capable of pinch-hitting if 
needed in areas outside their specialty. The FCC has many 
talented economists scattered across the agency, and I believe 
there is great benefit to creating a place where economists can 
work together on a greater variety of issues.  
 
Now let’s put the FCC’s structure in context. Look across gover-
nment at comparable agencies that handle competition and 
consumer protection issues. The FTC’s Bureau of Economics 
has nearly 80 Ph.D.-level economists. The Justice Department’s 
Antitrust Division employs an Economic Analysis group. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission has a Division of Econ-
omic and Risk Analysis. Each office is integrated into policy-
making across their agencies or divisions. We don’t do this at  
the FCC.  
 
Indeed, Chairman Pai has already begun the task of upgrading 
economic analysis within the FCC’s operating structure. In January 2018, the 
Chairman, joined by two of the other four commissioners, issued an Order 
creating the Office of Economics and Analytics (“OEA”), which will: 
 
(A) provide economic analysis, including cost-benefit analysis 
for rulemakings, transactions, adjudications, and other Com-
mission actions; 
(B) manage the FCC’s auctions in support of and in coordination 
with FCC Bureaus and Offices; 
(C) develop policies and strategies to help manage the FCC’s data 
resources and establish best practices for data use throughout 
the FCC in coordination with FCC Bureaus and Offices; and 
(D) conduct long-term research on ways to improve the Comm-
ission’s policies and processes in each of these areas.51 
																																								 																				
51 U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N., FCC 18-7, IN THE MATTER OF ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OFFICE 
OF ECONOMICS AND ANALYTICS, 1 (Jan. 30, 2018). 
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Chairman Pai sees the OEA as a vehicle “to make sure economics does in fact 
play a larger role at the FCC.”52 
Operationalizing Chairman Pai’s dream and extending it into an 
element of a full replacement of the silos model, here is what three new bureaus 
and one restructured bureau might look like after the FCC is transitioned to an 
entirely function-based structure:  
 
Bureau of Policy and Economics 
• Conducting and coordinating policy research and development 
that is presently done in-house by and for the Office of Strategic 
Planning and Policy Analysis (OSP);53 
• Conducting policy research and development that’s currently 
performed by OSP for other staff units, as well as rulemaking 
proceedings and research currently performed by the Media, 
Wireline, and Wireless Bureaus;54 
• Making policy recommendations for the Commission directly, 
including responsibilities currently performed by OSP, the 
Wireline Bureau, and the Wireless Bureau.55 
 
Bureau of Licensing and Grantmaking 
• Issuing licenses and authorizations;56 
• Conducting auctions;57 
• Administering the Universal Service Fund.58 
 
Engineering Bureau 
• Conducting pure and theoretical engineering research, including 
that presently being performed by OET;59 
• Advising the Commission directly on engineering matters, inclu-
ding current OET responsibilities;60 
																																								 																				
52 Id. at 10 (Statement of Chairman Ajit Pai). 
53 47 C.F.R. § 0.21(a), (e), (g), (h), (i).  
54 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.21(b) and (j) (OSP); 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(b), (c) and (g) (Media Bureau); 47 
C.F.R. §§ 0.91(e), (f), (g), (h), (i), and (l) (Wireline Bureau); 47 C.F.R. § 0.131(e), (f), (g). 
55 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.21(c), (d) and (f) (OSP); 47 C.F.R. § 0.91(a) (Wireline Bureau) 47 C.F.R. 
§ 0.131(a) (policy and rulemaking functions); §0.131(b) (Wireless Bureau). 
56 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(a) (Media Bureau); 47 C.F.R. §§0.131(a) (licensing functions); (j) (m), 
(n), (p), and (s) (Wireless Bureau). 
57 47 C.F.R. § 0.131(c) (Wireless Bureau). 
58 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.91 (n), (p) (Wireline Bureau); 47 C.F.R. § 0.131(r) (Wireless Bureau). 
59 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(c) and (e). 
60 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(d) and (f). 
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• Conducting engineering research and administration that’s pre-
sently done in-house by and for the Office of Engineering and 
Technology (OET);61 
• Assisting other bureaus and offices, including the Media, 
Wireline, and Wireless Bureaus, with engineering issues and 
research, including that currently performed by OET;62 
• Representing the Commission at international conferences and 
with international coordination, including current OET and 
Wireless Bureau assignments.63 
 
Enforcement Bureau64 
• Administer functions more closely related to enforcement than 
to policy that are presently handled by the Media, Wireline or 
Wireline Bureaus;65 
• Assume enforcement responsibilities currently held by the 
Media Bureau, such as broadcast and MVPD EEO, political 
																																								 																				
61 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(i), (j), (l), and (m) (OET). 
62 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(a), (g), (h), and (n). 
63 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.31(b) and (k) (OET); 47 C.F.R. § 0.131(h) and (k) (Wireless Bureau). 
64 There would be a need for coordination between the Enforcement Bureau and the Licensing 
and Grantmaking Bureau when a licensee’s basic qualifications are at issue, raising the question 
of whether an applicant for a license or grant is qualified.  See, inter alia, 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) 
(providing designation for hearing on broadcast license applications); Universal Service Fund, 
FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/universal-service-fund, (“The Telecommunications Act of 
1996 expanded the traditional definition of universal service—affordable, nationwide telephone 
service to include among other things rural health care providers and eligible schools and libraries.  
Today, the FCC provides universal service support through four mechanisms: (1) High Support 
Mechanism provides support to certain qualifying telephone companies that serve high cost areas; 
(2) Low Income Support Mechanism assists low-income customers; (3) Rural Health Care Supp-
ort Mechanism allows rural health care providers to pay rates for telecommunications services 
similar to those of their urban counterparts, making telehealth services affordable; and (4) Schools 
and Libraries Support Mechanism, popularly known as the ‘E-Rate,’ provides telecomm-
unications services, Internet access, and internal connections to eligible schools and libraries.”). 
65 Media Bureau ancillary functions include acting on “applications for authorization, peti-
tions for special relief, petitions to deny, waiver requests, requests for certification, 
objections, complaints, and requests for declaratory rulings and stays” in 47 C.F.R. § 0.61(h); 
as well as § 0.61(i) (discussing consumer complaints), § 0.61(j) (discussing subpoenas), § 
0.61(l) (providing public safety, this section is used to authorize waivers of broadcast station 
power restrictions in emergencies), and § 0.61(k) (offering an all functions except reserved 
provision). For Wireline Bureau ancillary functions, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.91(b) (providing 
requests for interpretation or waiver of rules), § 0.91(k) (providing consumer complaints, 
and § 0.91(m) (offering an all functions except reserved provision). For Wireless Bureau 
ancillary functions, see 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.131(i) (providing consumer complaints), § 0.131(o) 
(discussing subpoenas), and § 0.131(q) (discussing public safety). 
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broadcasting, and SHVIA, the Wireline Bureau such as those 
relating to license transfers, terminal attachments, and public 
safety, and the Wireless Bureau such as regulation of charges, 
practices, classifications, terms and conditions and facilities;66 
• Perform all current enforcement duties across all technologies.67 
 
This arrangement has four advantages over the current state of affairs: 
First, it would enhance efficiency by baking in platform neutrality.  
Each technology would receive the same regulatory presumptions, standards 
and benefits that other technologies receive—thus incentivizing innovation and 
investment and reducing appellate litigation risks to the agency. 
Second, it would incorporate into the organizational chart the lines of 
communication that currently have to be created artificially through cross-bureau 
task forces or, worse yet, through random communications among bureaus.68 
Third, decision-making would automatically adjust to changes in 
technology. Although media and telecom technologies change rapidly and 
unexpectedly, the laws of economics, policy and engineering are immutable. 
Thus the new structure would accommodate future technological evolution. 
Fourth, it would naturally centralize similar functions in their logical 
sites, with subject matter experts efficiently applying best practices across all 
industries, to the great benefit of consumers, the underserved, and the taxpayers. 
An especially salutary example of how this would happen can be found in civil 
rights regulation, which is detailed in the following section of this article. 
																																								 																				
66 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 0.61(d) (Media Bureau, EEO), 0.61(e) (providing political programming and 
related matters), and 0.61(f) (providing miscellaneous broadcast and cable matters such as video 
access to persons with disabilities and Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act (SHVIA)); 47 
C.F.R. §§ 0.91(d) (providing license transfers and discontinuance of service), § 0.91(j) (providing 
terminal attachments), and § 0.91(o) (public safety); § 0.131(d) (providing Wireless Bureau – 
charges, practices, classifications, terms and conditions, and facilities). 
67 47 C.F.R. § 0.111 (Enforcement Bureau). 
68 This issue of cross-bureau relationships, and the broader issue of inter-agency relationships, 
may have persuaded the Chairman to scale back a September 2017 internal trial balloon plan to 
create a Bureau of Economics and Data and, instead, create in January 2018 the Office of 
Economics and Analytics (OED).  In a posting on the Technology Policy Institute blog, former 
FCC chief economist (in 2014) Tim Brennan stated that “a separate bureau” could produce “a 
‘Siberia’ effect:  Pitting economists into a single place makes them easier to ignore . . . some staff 
economists have expressed concerns that segregating economists into a separate office will inhibit 
valuable collaborations with technologists and lawyers.”  Further, Brennan contended having a 
bureau of economics does not ensure that economists will have “a seat at the table when the FCC 
makes decisions.”  See Tim Brennan, Bolstering Economics at the FCC: Will a Separate Office 
Help?, TECH. POLICY INST. (Sept. 18, 2017), https://techpolicyinstitute.org/2017/09/18/bolster 
ing-economics-at-the-fcc-will-a-separate-office-help/.  The combination of economics and policy 
in the same bureau, as proposed herein, might resolve the “Siberia” and related governance issues. 
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IV. HOW WOULD FCC REORGANIZATION BY FUNCTION  
IMPACT CIVIL RIGHTS? 
 
 One of the great advantages of function-based organization of the FCC 
is that it would vastly improve the agency’s ability to advance the goal of full 
inclusion of minorities and women in the nation’s most influential industries. 
Under a functional structure, the FCC would naturally combine all of its civil 
rights enforcement offices—across sector-specific rules and across multiple 
technologies—in the Enforcement Bureau.69 Such an office would apply, to 
civil rights, the FCC’s longstanding stated goals of regulatory parity and 
platform neutrality—the principles that hold that all technologies are regulated 
in the same way unless there are defensible reasons for regulating them 
differently. Thus, the Bureau of Policy and Economics would handle all civil 
rights policymaking.70  
 This means that the best practices of each element of civil rights 
regulation would be implemented across the board for all technologies. For 
example, the highly successful cable and MVPD equal procurement oppor-
tunity rule—which requires the dissemination of requests for proposals (RFPs) 
broadly enough to reach all qualified contractors, including those owned by 
minorities and women, would be extended to all technologies.71 
																																								 																				
69 The FCC is considering MMTC’s proposal to transfer broadcast and MVPD EEO 
enforcement from the Media Bureau to the Enforcement Bureau. See U.S. FED. COMM. 
COMM’N., MB DOCKET NO. 14-50, FCC 16-107, IN THE MATTER OF 2014 QUADRENNIAL 
REGULATORY REVIEW, 144 (Aug. 10, 2016) (acknowledging that “enforcement of the Media 
Bureau Equal Employment Opportunity rules, which is presently handled by the Media 
Bureau, might be more appropriate as a function of the Enforcement Bureau, given the 
Enforcement Bureau’s existing mission and expertise in the enforcement of the Comm-
ission’s regulations” and directing several bureaus and offices “to discuss the feasibility, 
implications, and logistics of shifting the enforcement of the Media Bureau Equal 
Employment Opportunity rules from the Media Bureau to the Enforcement Bureau.”). 
70 It is well established that an instrumentality established to “promote” a technology is inherently 
conflicted when also charged with enforcing proscriptive regulations against licensees using that 
technology.  A classic example is the 1974 re-establishment the National Transportation Safety 
Board as a separate entity outside of the Department of Transportation, thus enabling the NTSB 
to perform its investigative functions independently.  See History of the National Transportation 
Safety Board, NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., https://www.ntsb.gov/about/history/Pages/default 
.aspx (discussing the NTSB’s independence). Presently FCC broadcast and MVPD EEO 
regulation is performed by the Media Bureau rather than the Enforcement Bureau. This anomaly 
would be corrected naturally if the silo-based FCC structure were replaced with a functional 
structure.  In such event, broadcast and MVPD EEO enforcement would logically find its way 
over to the Enforcement Bureau. 
71 Erroneously claiming that it was outside the scope of the media ownership proceeding, the 
Commission in 2014 failed to adopt a proposal by MMTC—backed by 57 national civil rights 
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 The advertising nondiscrimination rule and the transactional nondis-
crimination rule each apply exclusively to broadcasting only because the 
dockets giving birth to them in 2008 just happened to be broadcast (“MB” or 
“Media Bureau”) dockets.72 But there is no logical reason why these rules 
should not apply to other technologies.  Under function-based regulation, they 
would almost automatically apply to all technologies. 
 The grandmother of them all—EEO regulation—does apply across all 
technologies, but the underlying rules and precedents are different for each 
industry.73 The reasons for this patchwork of regulations go back 40 years, to 
a time when the labor pools for the various regulated industries seldom 
significantly overlapped. Today, however, the labor pools of most FCC-
regulated industries have largely converged—a fact the FCC recognized as far 
back as 1999.74 
 The proposed reorganization of the FCC by functions rather than silos 
would produce civil rights regulation that would be a vast improvement on the 
current regulatory piecemeal quilt: 
 
• The rules would be consistent across platforms, and thus 
more equitable than the current rules. 
• The rules would be administered by a single office populated 
by a core staff of subject matter experts, using best practices 
																																								 																				
organizations—to extend the cable and MVPD procurement rule to all regulated communications 
technologies.  See U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N supra note 69.  In 2016, the Third Circuit of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals accepted the FCC’s word that, on remand, the FCC would consider the 
procurement proposal at least as it related to the broadcasting industry.  See Prometheus Radio 
Project v. Fed. Comm. Comm’n, 824 F.3d 33, 50 (3d Cir. 2016). When the FCC again failed to 
do so, the MMTC and the National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters (NABOB) 
petitioned for review once again.  MMTC and NABOB v. FCC, No. 18-1670 (3d Cir., Apr. 5, 2018). 
72 U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N., MB DOCKET NO. 07-294, IN THE MATTER OF PROMOTING 
DIVERSIFICATION AND OWNERSHIP (June 16, 2008). 
73 Differences among the rules include the number of recruitment initiatives a reporting unit 
must engage in, different time periods for when these recruitment initiatives must occur, 
religious affiliation requirements, and the implementation of reporting requirements.  
Compare, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(c)(1) and (2) (discussing broadcasting) with 47 C.F.R. 
§ 76.75(b)(1) and (2), and with §§ 76.77 (discussing cable).  If there is a logical reason for 
the differences in these regulations, it is not immediately apparent. 
74 See A New Federal Communications Commission for the 21st Century, FCC, 4 (1999), 
https://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/fcc21.pdf, (“Convergence across communications indus-
tries is already taking place, and is likely to accelerate as competition develops further.  Thus, 
in addition to refocusing our resources on our core functions for a world of fully competitive 
communications markets, the FCC must also assess, with the help of Congress and others, 
how to streamline and consolidate our policymaking functions for a future where conver-
gence has blurred traditional regulatory definitions and jurisdictional boundaries.”). 
Vol. 3:2]   FCC Reorganization 
 
 
187 
drawn from all technologies.  Thus they would be more cost-
effective, more efficient, and more responsive to the needs 
being addressed by today’s patchwork of rules. 
• Since the rules would apply across all platforms, they would 
provide greater coverage and extend current successful regu-
lations throughout all of the industries touched by the FCC. 
 
Industry leaders, including all of the major trade associations, have not 
opposed extension of these rules across the board.75 They recognize that bad 
actors drag down their industries, and that diversity improves companies’ 
bottom lines.76 They also recognize that diversity promotes competition, as 
Commissioner Martin famously explained in approving new broadcast EEO 
rules in 2002 in the wake of MD/DC/DE Broadcasters: 
 
By choosing candidates from a larger, more diverse pool, 
broadcasters and MVPDs will be better able to find the most 
qualified candidates.  A more talented workforce leads to impro-
ved programming, which ultimately benefits all consumers.  The 
program we adopt today therefore should promote not just 
diversity, but also true competition.77 
 
																																								 																				
75 No one, including representatives of the broadcasting industry, opposed the FCC’s 2008 
adoption of the broadcast advertising nondiscrimination rule and the broadcast transactional 
nondiscrimination rule; and no one opposed the 2014 extension of the cable and MVPD 
procurement rule to other technologies.  
76 The social science data overwhelmingly demonstrates that diverse companies perform better 
for their shareholders and for consumers.  See, e.g., Why Diversity Matters, CATALYSt, 3 (July 
2013), http://www.catalyst.org/system/files/why_diversity_matters_catalyst_0.pdf (reporting 
that “[a] study that focused on 151 firms on the Australian Securities Exchange found that women 
had a positive impact on economic growth and social responsiveness. Firms with two or more 
women board directors had higher returns on equity, higher market-to-book value (M/B), and 
improved corporate sustainability via higher social responsiveness,” and, “Catalyst’s 2004 
research found that companies with the highest representation of women in senior leadership had 
35 percent higher return on equity and 34 percent higher total return to shareholders”; see also 
Cedric Herring, Does Diversity Pay?: Race, Gender, and the Business Case for Diversity, 74 AM. 
SOCIOLOGICAL R. 208 (2009) (finding that a racially diverse workforce was positively correlated 
with more customers, increased sales revenue, greater relative profits, and greater market share, 
and gender diversity is positively associated with increased sales revenue, more customers, and 
greater relative profits). 
77 U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N., MM DOCKET NO. 98-204, FCC 02-303, IN THE MATTER OF 
REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S BROADCAST AND CABLE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUN-
ITY RULES AND POLICIES (Nov. 7, 2002).  
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V.  THE PATHWAY FROM SILOS TO FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION 
 
Reorganization of the FCC is achievable but not without challenges.  
Any reorganization of this magnitude would, unavoidably be somewhat 
disruptive in the short run. The FCC would become dysfunctional for at least 
a few weeks while it is recuperating, but that is the least of our worries. There 
are many reasons why the FCC has resisted structural reform for decades. 
Ever since the Communications Act of 1934 combined the telephone 
and telegraph regulatory functions previously handled by the Department of 
Commerce and the Interstate Commerce Commission with the radio regulatory 
functions previously handled by the Federal Radio Commission,78 media and 
telecom legislation has been organized by silos.  This legislation has translated 
itself into silo-based FCC operating units.79  There are reasons why silo-based 
regulation has persisted for so many decades. 
Perhaps the greatest hurdle to overcome in a transition from silos to 
functions is the unavoidable skepticism of established incumbent companies that 
are accustomed to the predictability and performance of “their” silos.  Silo-based 
lawmaking has worked well for some of the regulated industries, which have 
enjoyed the opportunity to have “their” bureau (Media, Wireless or Wireline) 
issue “products” (licenses and rules) that facilitate business in the markets in 
which they operate, irrespective of whether the rules differ from those emanating 
from competing industries’ bureaus. A shift to function-based bureaus would 
produce platform-neutrality, but inevitably that means that someone’s platform-
advantage becomes less advantaged for themselves, even if it advances equality, 
free speech (and more speech), and competition for the public. 
Nothing in the Communications Act prevents the Chairman of the FCC 
from reorganizing the agency on his own.  But as a practical matter, anything 
as consequential as a major reorganization would need to be performed by, or 
be closely supervised by Congress, which holds the agency’s purse strings. As 
this is written, the FCC and most other parts of the federal government are 
under a hiring freeze. A new function-based structure would probably require 
about the same number of personnel as the current silo-based structure, but 
relatively more economists.  Thus, the FCC Chairman would need the 
cooperation of Congress to be sure the new structure is fully staffed with the 
skill sets he needs. 
There is another reason why the FCC Chairman would be well advised 
to rely on Congress to take the lead and act in a bipartisan way to effectuate a 
transition from a silo-based to function-based FCC structure.  Over the past 
two decades, the FCC itself has come to be regarded as highly partisan, perhaps 
																																								 																				
78 STUART MINOR BENJAMIN & JAMES B. SPETA, TELECOMM. L. & POLICY, 52-53 (2nd ed. 2006). 
79Id. at 53-54. 
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even more so than today’s Congress. Thus there will be resistance to restruc-
turing the agency if the administration is perceived as using the reorganization 
process to achieve unrelated deregulatory objectives that could not be achieved 
as easily on their own. Those who disagree with the administration’s policy 
directions might reasonably fear that any major reorganization of the FCC 
could be used—even unintentionally—for the diminishment or downgrading 
of staff units that study, administer, or enforce policy priorities with which the 
administration disagrees, such as Title II internet regulation80 or enforcement 
of the media structural ownership rules.81 The same fears would attach in 
reverse if a reorganization of the agency were administered after 2020, when 
members of the party not currently in power might lead the FCC. 
																																								 																				
80 See FCC Proposes Ending Utility-Style Regulation Of The Internet, FCC NEWS (May 18, 2017), 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0518/DOC-344948A1.pdf. 
81 See U.S. FED. COMM. COMM’N., MB DOCKET NO. 14-50, FCC 14-28, IN THE MATTER OF 
2014 QUADRENNIAL REGULATORY REVIEW – REVIEW OF THE COMMISSION’S BROADCAST 
OWNERSHIP RULES AND OTHER RULES ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 202 OF THE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (Mar. 31, 2014) (subsequent history omitted).  On the 
other hand, no one should fear that the Commission would use reorganization to undercut 
the natural enhancement of civil rights enforcement that would naturally attend the 
replacement of a silo-based structure with a functional structure.  To be sure, it appears that 
several federal agencies and departments’ civil rights enforcement programs are undergoing 
severe cutbacks in their budgets or reversals of their substantive focus. See Letter of the 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights and 99 Organizations to President 
Donald J. Trump, (June 5, 2017), http://www.civilrights.org/advocacy/letters/2017/coali 
tion_letter_civil_rights_enforcement.html; Juliet Eilperin et. al, Trump administration plans 
to minimize civil rights efforts in agencies, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/politics/trump-administration-plans-to-minimize-civil-rights-efforts-in-agenci 
es/2017/05/29/922fc1b2-39a7-11e7-a058-ddbb23c75d82_story.html.  Cutbacks in civil rig-
hts enforcement and in support programs for minority, women and small businesses have 
occurred in the past at the FCC; the author of this article had to obtain congressional 
intervention to rescue FCC minority business offices from closure in 1981, 1989 and 2005.  
This history contrasts sharply with the plans of the current Chairman, who has upgraded the 
Commission’s small business office.  See Chairman Pai Announces [Sanford] Williams to 
Serve as Director of Communications Business Opportunities Team, FCC NEWS (June 7, 
2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0607/DOC-345240 
A1.pdf.  Chairman Pai has also re-established the Advisory Committee on Diversity for Co-
mmunications in the Digital Age, now re-named the Advisory Committee on Diversity and 
Digital Empowerment, which was not re-chartered in 2013 under the previous Chairman.  
See FCC Seeks Nominations for Membership on Advisory Committee on Diversity and 
Digital Empowerment, FCC NEWS (June 7, 2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Relea 
ses/Daily_Business/2017/db0607/DA-17-557A1.pdf.  Recently the Chairman announced a 
broad set of civil rights initiatives aimed at bridging the digital divide.  See Ajit Pai, Chair-
man, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Remarks at MMTC’s 9th Annual Broadband and Social Justice 
Summit, Washington, DC (Feb. 6, 2018).  
                                  Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [Aug. 2018 
 
 
190 
In light of these entirely foreseeable political considerations, a cong-
ressional task force focused on efficiency and cost-saving, with the gravitas of 
the Landis, Ash, or Hoover Commissions,82 would need to persuade Congress 
that a functional structure is preferable to a silo-based structure from the stand-
point of good government. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Organizing by function rather than by technology silos would have 
many benefits. The FCC would be in a better position to ensure consistency of 
treatment of technologies as technologies change, thereby producing fairness, 
efficiency, and a measure of economic stability in regulation that would enhan-
ce the overall investment potential of the tech sector. 
High on the list of reasons why the FCC should be reorganized by 
function rather than by silo is that a function-based FCC would lead to more 
effective civil rights management and enforcement. That, in turn, would yield 
greater participation by minorities and women in the media and telecom ind-
ustries. The Commission’s obligation to regulate in the public interest by 
eliminating discrimination is just as compelling in one of its regulated 
industries as it is in any other. Platform neutrality and regulatory parity, deli-
vered through functional reorganization of the FCC, can help deliver us to this 
Promised Land. 
Please, FCC, reorganize thyself! 
 
																																								 																				
82 Harry M. Shooshan, supra note 27. 
